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ABSTRACT
This thesis explores the linkage between the right to self-determination and democracy. In view of the
popular uprisings taking place throughout the Middle East and North Africa, it is highly relevant to
revisit the concept of self-determination. In particular, considering the undetermined nature of the right
to self-determination, this thesis examines the contemporary legal meaning of self-determination.
Specifically, it questions the prospects of “the people” to self-determination against the background of
undemocratic structures at the global level. Following the introduction, the second part of this thesis
deals with a critical overview of the international legal ideology on self-determination. In the third part,
the legal content and scope of the right to self-determination regarding its political and economic
dimension will be explored. Consequently, an examination of Egypt's approaches to self-determination
will not only illustrate the obstacles to democratization, but will primarily serve as a test case for
exploring the (in)compatibility of the process of economic liberalization with the right to selfdetermination.
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"The people want the overthrow of the regime."

1

"The will of the people shall be the basis of the
2
authority of government."

I. INTRODUCTION
After the revolution in Tunisia that succeeded in overthrowing President Ben Ali, popular
demonstrations followed in Egypt on January 25, 2011 to protest not only poverty, unemployment and
corruption but particularly, the autocratic regime of President Mubarak.3 These protests, which led to
Mubarak's resignation on February 11, were the first on this scale in Egypt since the uprisings over the
price of bread in the 1970s. 4
After decades of authoritarian rule in Egypt, Western states, first and foremost the US and EU, had
"neither expected these protests nor, at least at the outset, hoped for them. Mubarak had been a loyal
ally; 5 the speed with which they celebrated his fall as a triumph of democracy was slightly anomalous
if not unseemly." 6 In this regard, the European response to the "overthrow of the regime" echoed for
the most part the US administration’s call for an "orderly transition" to liberal democracy.7
The Western interest in the export of liberal democracy is based on the theory of democratic
peace 8 and the notion that liberal democracy is the only type of legitimate governance.9 In the words
of Francis Fukuyama, Western liberal democracy is "the end point of mankind's ideological evolution
and [...] the final form of human government."10 Hence, Western liberal democracy 11 is considered as

1

Political slogan during Egyptian uprising in January 2011. See ICG, Popular Protest in North Africa and the
Middle East (I): Egypt Victorious? 9 (2011), http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-northafrica/north-africa/egypt/101-popular-protest-in-north-africa-and-the-middle-east-I-egypt-victorious.aspx.
U.N. UDHR art. 21, para. 3.
2
3
Craig Kanalley, Egypt Revolution 2011: A Complete Guide to the Unrest (2011),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/30/egypt-revolution-2011_n_816026.html.
4 Aljazeera, Fresh Anti-Govt Protests in Egypt (2011),
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2011/01/201112663450547321.html.
5
Holger Albrecht, Authoritarian Opposition and the Politics of Challenge in Egypt, in Debating Arab
Authoritarianism: Dynamics and Durability in Nondemocratic Regimes 74 (Oliver Schlumberger ed., 2007).
6
ICG, supra note 1, at 4.
7 BBC, Egypt: EU Calls for 'Orderly Transition' (2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-12329941.
8
The theory of democratic peace refers to Immanuel Kant's perpetual peace that may be established if three
conditions are met: First, states should have a republican constitution that is widely considered to
correspond to today's liberal democratic constitution. Second, states should join together to a pacific
federation and third, this federation should be underpinned by a body of cosmopolitan law. According to
Michael Doyle, states with liberal democratic constitutions are peaceful among each other, because they
commit to citizens' juridical equality and the protection of fundamental civil rights, representative legislatures
which base their authority on the consent of the electorate, recognition of private property rights, and a free
market economy shaped by forces of supply and demand. However, Doyle also acknowledges that liberal
democracies tend to be war prone in their relations with non-liberal societies. See Immanuel Kant, Perpetual
Peace, in Kant's Political Writings 93 (Hans Reiss ed., 1991). Susan Marks, The Riddle of All Constitutions:
International Law, Democracy, and the Critique of Ideology 35-6 (OUP 2003). Michael Doyle, Kant, Liberal
Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, 12 Phil. & Pub. Affairs 205, 207-8 (1983).
9
Thomas Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 Am. J. Int'l L. 46 (1992). Gregory Fox,
The Right to Political Participation in International Law, 17 Yale J. Int'l L. 539 (1992).
10 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (Free Press, 1992).
11 In this paper I rely on Anne-Marie Slaughter's definition of liberal democracy. In her article entitled
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ideal realization of peoples' right to self-determination against the background of a presupposed
"common evolutionary pattern for all human societies." 12 However, if self-determination is necessarily
linked to Western liberal democracy, it leaves no room for people's own perception of the
representative form of the government and therefore, it is in itself contrary to self-determination. 13
The right to self-determination of peoples is codified in the Articles 1(2) and 55 of the UN Charter
(1945) and became just like peace, security and human rights, one of the purposes of the UN.14 Both
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) define self-determination as a human right in Article 1.
In its first paragraph the Article stipulates: "All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of
that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and
cultural development."15
The tendency to Western prescription of liberal democracy is not only contrary to selfdetermination, but also conflicts with the Westphalian paradigm. According to this paradigm, states
determine their own constitutional model on the basis of co-existence and non-interference without
pointing to a particular model of governance. 16 In this regard, traditionally, international law is neither
related to democracy17 nor any political model.18 However, after the end of the Cold War and the
collapse of the Soviet Union and state socialism, Western states, above all the US and NATO member
states, declared liberal democracy and capitalism as positive endpoints of ideology.19
The idea of the universal validity of both liberal democracy and capitalism underlies an Eurocentric
linear understanding of modernization. Accordingly, “the future of the peripheral [less-developed]
countries is supposedly represented by the present modernity of the core countries,” 20 basically, the
US and Western Europe. In this context, political economic development is principally determined by
endogenous factors, whereby economic liberalization is viewed as necessary condition for political

12
13
14
15
16
17

18
19
20

"International Law in a World of Liberal States," she defines liberal democracy as "some form of
representative government secured by the separation of powers, constitutional guarantees of civil and
political rights, juridical equality, and a functioning judicial system dedicated to the rule of law." See AnneMarie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 Euro. J. Int'l. L. 503 (1994).
Id. at 48. Marks, supra note 8, at 33.
David Raic, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination 276-277 (Kluwer Law International, 2002).
U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2. U.N. Charter art. 55. Hans Morten Haugen, The Right to Self-Determination and
Natural Resources: The Case of Western Sahara, 3/1 LEAD 70, 72 (2007).
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) Annex, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/2200(XXI) Annex (Dec. 16, 1966). International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI) Annex (Dec. 16, 1966).
Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, The Future of International Law is Domestic (or, the European
Way of Law), 47 Harv. Int'l L.J. 328 (2006).
For instance, Jan Wouters argues that the neutrality on democracy of traditional international law is
exemplified by the transfer of debts from undemocratic to democratic regimes. Jan Wouters, Bart De
Meester & Cedric Ryngaert, Democracy and International Law 5 (2004),
http://www.ggs.kuleuven.be/nieuw/publications/working%20papers/archive/wp05.pdf.
Id. at 5.
Fukuyama, supra note 9. Sonia Lucarelli, Peace and Democracy: The Rediscovered Link: The EU, NATO
and the European System of Liberal-Democratic Security Communities 5 (2002),
http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/00-02/Lucarelli%27s.pdf.
Barry Gills & Joel Rocamora, Low Intensity Democracy, 13 Third World Q. 501, 502-503 (1992).
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liberalization. 21 Hence, democratization and the deconstruction of authoritarianism is assumed to be
“the necessary and natural product of submission to the rationality of the worldwide market.”22
As political equivalent of the free market, proponents of this ideology argue, that liberal democracy
is the ideal model of governance and political foundation for legitimacy. Therefore, liberal democracy
also constitutes the system that most likely promotes international peace and stability.23 Following this
assumption, the neutrality of traditional international law regarding the internal form of government of
states gradually changed.24 For instance, liberal democracy became a condition for state recognition25
as well as a requirement for membership in regional international organizations such as NATO,
Council of Europe (COE), EU or Organization for American States (OAS).26
Assuming the universal validity of both the utopian end of “democratic peace” and the liberal means
to that end, 27 proponents of liberal democracy argue "that the right to [...] self-determination can be
realized by means of an emerging right to democratic governance."28 However, the association of
liberal democracy with a supposed state of nature, is ignorant of the way in which the subjugation of
nation-states' sovereignty under the ideological hegemony of the singular, but exemplary liberal nature
of the Western world, is in itself illiberal. Against this background, the “natural” linkage between
peoples' right to self-determination and liberal democracy is controversial, not least because there is
neither an agreement on the accurate interpretation of democracy,29 nor is there clarity on the extent
that the right to self-determination actually requires democracy.
This thesis explores the linkage between the right to self-determination and democracy. In view of
the popular uprisings taking place throughout the Middle East and North Africa, it is highly relevant to
revisit the concept of self-determination. In particular, considering the undetermined nature of the right
to self-determination, this thesis examines the contemporary legal meaning of self-determination.
Specifically, it questions the prospects of “the people” to self-determination against the background of
undemocratic structures at the global level. Following the introduction, the second part of this thesis
deals with a critical overview of the international legal ideology on self-determination. In the third part,
the legal content and scope of the right to self-determination regarding its political and economic
21 Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (University of Chicago Press, 1962). Seymour M. Lipset, Some
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy, 53 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 69105 (1959). Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (Unwin Paperbacks, 1987).
Samir Amin, The Issues of Democracy in the Contemporary Third World, in Low Intensity Democracy:
Political Power in the New World Order (Barry Gills, et al. eds., 1993).
Christoph Zürcher, Building Democracy while Building Peace, 22 J. Dem. 81 (2011).
Simone van den Driest, Pro-Democratic Intervention and the Right to Political Self-Determination: The Case
of Operation Iraqi Freedom, NILR 29, 10 (2010). Wouters, De Meester & Ryngaert supra note 17, at 4.
For example, the European Union made democracy a condition for the recognition of new states in Eastern
Europe. See Wouters, De Meester & Ryngaert supra note 17, at 17-18.
Id. at 19-22. Roland Rich, Bringing Democracy into International law, 12 J. Dem. 20, 3 (2001).
William Rasch, Sovereignty and its Discontents: On the Primacy of Conflict and the Structure of the Political
51-52 (Cavendish Publishing, 2004).
In this regard, governance is democratic if political authority is awarded through periodic multi-party
elections, supported by civil rights and constitutional order committed to the rule of law. See Marks, supra
note 8, at 2. Fox, supra note 9.
Frank Cunningham, for instance, refers to four main approaches of democratic governance: the
constitutional, procedural, substantive, and process-oriented approach. For a more detailed elaboration of
each approach: See Frank Cunningham, Theories of Democracy: A Critical Introduction (Routledge, 2002).
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dimension will be explored. Consequently, an examination of Egypt's approaches to self-determination
will not only illustrate the obstacles to democratization, but will primarily serve as a test case for
exploring the (in)compatibility of the process of economic liberalization with the right to selfdetermination.
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II. CRITIQUE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL IDEOLOGY ON SELF-DETERMINATION
The right to self-determination is usually referred to in the colonial context as people's right to establish
their own sovereign state or to freely associate with or integrate in another state. 30 Accordingly, the
right to self-determination of people under colonialism did not involve legal obligations for states,
rather it was considered to be consumed as soon as the dependent territory achieved independence
from its colonial power. 31
The right to self-determination has been recognized as fundamental legal right32 and expanded in
respect of an internal and an external dimension.33 The external dimension includes the right to selfdetermination under colonialism. In contrast, the internal dimension entitles all people to "freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development."34
Hence, political self-determination is understood as the right to directly or indirectly participate in the
political decision-making process and to determine the structure of the state, the form of governance
and "persons to be entrusted with political power" without the intervention, manipulation or interference
of a third state.35 Accordingly, people have the right to act as pouvoir constituant and to constitute their
own representative and participatory political system. 36 Given that the right to internal selfdetermination is inalienable and ongoing,37 it "implies that at any moment in time, the people can

30
31
32

33
34
35
36
37

See Percy Lenhing, Theories of Secession (Routledge, 1998). Stephen Maedo & Allen Buchanan,
Secession and Self-Determination (New York University Press, 2003). Magret Moore, National SelfDetermination and Secession (Oxford University Press, 1998).
van den Driest, supra note 24.
The right to self-determination has widely been recognized as obligation erga omnes. The International
Court of Justice (ICJ) stated in the Barcelona Traction case (1970) that there are obligations erga omnes in
international law that are owed by states "towards the international community as a whole," and that
therefore, "all states can be held to have a legal interest in their protection." See Case Concerning the
Barcelona traction, Light and Power Company Limited (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5) (Judgment). In
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the ICJ identified
the right to self-determination as obligation erga omnes. See On the Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136. Other
documents suggest that the right to self-determination has also the status of jus cogens (peremptory norm in
times of war or peace). See U.N. C.H.R., 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2000/4 (Apr. 7, 2000).
Commentary on art. 26 (5), Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (with
commentaries), in Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-third Session, UN
GAOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (Aug. 10, 2001), reprinted in James Crawford, The International Law
Commission's Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries (CUP, 2002). Armed
Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. of the Congo v. Rwanda), 2006 I.C.J. 90 (Feb. 3)
(separate opinion of Judge ad hoc Dugard).
van den Driest, supra note 24.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) Annex, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/2200(XXI) Annex (Dec. 16, 1966). International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI) Annex (Dec. 16, 1966).
Jan Klabbers & Rene Lefeber, Africa: Lost Between Uti Possidetis and Self-Determination, in Peoples and
Materials in International Law 43-44 (Catherine Brölmann et al.,1993).
Allan Rosas, Internal Self-Determination, in Modern Law of Self-Determination 201 (Christian Tomuschat
ed., 1993).
Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 12: Article 1: The Right to Self-Determination of Peoples
(1984),
http://www.ccprcentre.org/doc/ICCPR/General%20Comments/HRI.GEN.1.Rev.9%28Vol.I%29_%28GC12%2
9_en.pdf.
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change or re-create the manifestation of their system of government and administration."38
According to Rosalyn Higgins, the contemporary concept of internal self-determination is a nonsessionist right of people within an independent state. 39 Likewise, Christian Tomuschat and Thomas
Franck emphasize the universal applicability of self-determination as international human right and
associate it with an emerging "norm of democratic governance" in international law.40 Hence,
democratic governance is understood as political foundation for legitimacy and therefore, a criterion in
the recognition of states. 41
This notion of an international "right to democratic governance" 42 has been interpreted by some
Western states as imperative to "do everything possible to promote [their conception of] democracy in
the world," including pro-democratic military interventions. 43 Traditionally, international law has not
attended to national constitutional issues such as how a constitution is made or whether the internal
structures of states are legitimate.44 For instance, Article 2(7) of the UN Charter stipulates that neither
UN nor UN members have the authority to intervene "in matters which are essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of any state."45 In this regard, Jan Wouters and Bart De Meester argue that the
definition of a constitutional model is "undoubtedly the nec plus ultra of a matter under the national
jurisdiction."46 However, as the cases of post-conflict constitution-making in Iraq and Afghanistan
illustrate, constitution-making has become a shared international effort to promote liberal democracy.47
In view of the interpretation of the "right to democratic governance" as right to liberal democracy,
Brad Roth and Susan Marks argue that such an interpretation deprives international law "of its
indispensable role as an overlapping consensus among societies that otherwise radically differ on
fundamental matters." 48 On the contrary, such an interpretation of the "right to democratic
governance," might be exemplary for the democratic deficit of international governance as well as for
the consolidation of a Western liberal conception of human rights.
38 Raic, supra note 13, at 237-238.
39 A.A. Idowu, Revisiting the Right to Self-Determination in Modern International Law: Implications for African
States (2008), http://www.eurojournals.com/ejss_6_4_05.pdf.

40 Franck, supra note 9. Christian Tomuschat, Modern Law of Self-Determination 9 (Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 1993).

41 Marks, supra note 8.
42 Franck, supra note 9.
43 An example of pro-democratic intervention is the US-led invasion in Iraq in 2003. See van den Driest, supra

note 24, at 41. On the prohibition to intervene, see Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations: G.A.
Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/8082 (Oct. 24, 1970).
44 Vijayashri Sripati, Faking or Crafting Genuine Constitutionalism? A Critique of the UN's Constitutional
Assistance in Afghanistan (2008), http://www.soas.ac.uk/cceil/events/file44082.pdf.
45 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7. In Article 2(4) the UN Charter further emphasizes that states are not authorized
to impose democracy by forcible means. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. In the Nicaragua case the International
Court of Justice affirms that the principle of non-intervention - the right of every state to conduct its affairs
and to choose its own form of government without outside interference - as customary international law.
Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1989 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
46 Wouters, De Meester & Ryngaert supra note 17, at 3. See International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI) Annex (Dec. 16, 1966). International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) Annex, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/2200(XXI) Annex (Dec. 16, 1966).
47 Sripati, supra note 44, at 12.
48 Marks, supra note 8.
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With respect to the democratic deficit of international governance, organizations such as the UN,
exercise political authority without democratic accountability.49 For instance, the Security Council (SC)
increasingly creates, de jure or de facto,50 "legal norms and attach consequences to noncompliance."51 Although democracy is not a UN membership requirement,52 the SC authorized the use
of force to restore "democratic governance" in several instances. 53 In the context of "democracy
consolidation" and "reconstruction," the UN promotes "good governance,"54 which "brings to its
ultimate consequences liberal approaches to democracy."55 In this regard, Laura Zanotti notes that
"development" is mainly framed as internal problem. Consequently, "[i]t's causes are not to be
researched in the international economic order, capital concentrations or distribution of wealth, but
mainly in the inappropriate functioning of the institutions of less-developed states." 56 However, given
that the "fate of national communities is increasingly shaped by decisions taken outside the framework
of national political institutions," democracy - which ideally functions as "key indicator of legitimacy for
the exercise of political authority" at the national level - must go beyond national institutions to
overcome the democratic deficit in international settings including the "'private' domain of global
markets."57
As a consequence of the democratic deficit of international governance, there is no "global public
that defines itself by reference to the exercise of global regulatory functions or that possesses the

49 The democratic deficit of the UN is a consequence of the in-existent separation of powers within the

50
51

52
53

54

55
56
57

organization. Particularly, the SC, as sole executive power, is characterized by systemic arbitrariness. For
instance, the adoption of SC resolutions under Chapter VII, exclusively depends on the interests of the five
permanent member states. Hans Köchler, Security Council Reform: A Requirement of International
Democracy 3-4 (2007), http://www.hanskoechler.com/Koechler-Security_Council-Reform-CSF-TurinV325Aug07.pdf. Wouters, De Meester & Ryngaert supra note 17, at 1.
Jost Delbrück, Exercising Public Authority Beyond the State: Transnational Democracy and /or Alternative
Legitimation Strategies?, 10 Ind. J. of Glob. Legal Stud., 29, 35 (2003).
In particular in the field of anti-terrorism and the fight against impunity, "international regulations" of the
Security Council directly affect citizens, for instance in the case of "smart sanctions" that are directed against
individuals rather than the state. See Jan Wouters & Philip De Man, International Organizations as LawMakers 8 (2009), http://www.ggs.kuleuven.be/nieuw/publications/working%20papers/new_series/wp21.pdf.
Steven Wheatley, The Democratic Legitimacy of International Law: The Role of Non-State Actors 1 (2007)
http://www.baselgovernance.org/fileadmin/docs/pdfs/Nonstate/Paper-Wheatley.pdf.
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7.
SC authorized the use of force to restore democratic governance, for instance, in Haiti, S.C. Res. 940, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/940 (July 31, 1994); Sierra Leone, S.C. Res. 1270, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1270 (October 22, 1999);
Liberia, S.C. Res. 866, U.N. Doc. S/RES/866 (October 5, 1993). See Gerry Simpson, Two Liberalisms, 21
Euro. J. Int'l. L. 537, 558 (2001). David Kennedy, The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the
Problem? (2002), http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/orgs/hrj/iss15/kennedy.shtml. Susan Marks, What
has Become of the Emerging Right to Democratic Governance?, 22 Eur. J. Int'l. L. 507, 522 (2011).
According to the UN, "good governance" (equity, participation, pluralism, transparency, accountability, rule of
law) is put into practice through the "holding of free, fair and frequent elections, representative legislatures
that make laws and provide oversight and an independent judiciary." See UN, Global Issues: Governance
(2011), www.un.org/en/globalissues/governance/.
Marks, supra note 53, at 516, 523. Laura Zanotti, Governmentalizing the Post-Cold War International
Regime: The UN Debate on Democratization and Good Governance, 30 Alternatives 461, 479 (2005).
Zanotti, supra note 55, at 479.
Peter J. Schraeder, Exporting Democracy: Rhetoric vs. Reality, 16 Euro. J Int'l L. 1001, 1004 (2006) (book
review). Susan Marks, The Riddle of all Constitutions: International Law, Democracy and the Critique of
Ideology, 16 Euro. J. Int'l L. 1001, 1002 (2006) (book review). Marks, supra note 8, at 3. Barry Gills, LowIntensity Democracy, in Low-Intensity Democracy: Political Power in the New World Order 30 (Barry Gills
eds., 1993).
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capacity of (global) opinion- and will-formation (no demos, no democracy)."58 Accordingly, there is no
"basic understanding of the common good" in international law. 59 Hence, the emergence of so-called
"cosmopolitan values of human rights, democracy and concern for the social welfare of 'others'," 60 is
not based on an "overlapping consensus among societies," rather it is a product of a particular
moment and place that David Kennedy defines as "post-enlightenment, rationalist, secular, Western,
modern, capitalist" or what Gerry Simpson calls "liberal anti-pluralism."61
However, when "the global expression of emancipatory objectives in human rights terms narrows
humanity’s appreciation of these objectives to the forms they have taken in the nineteenth- and
twentieth-century Western political tradition,62 it causes the loss of more diverse and local experiences
and conceptions of emancipation."63 For instance, if the "right to democratic governance" is reduced to
the "right to liberal democracy," it leaves no room for people's own perception of the representative
form of government and therefore, it does not only exclude the expression of local experiences and
conceptions, but is also contrary to the right to self-determination.
This is particularly problematic in the context of less-developed states, where the "right to
democratic governance" is reduced to the promotion of procedural democracy or "low-intensity
democracy."64 Even though, low-intensity democracy closely corresponds with the definition of a
liberal state, 65 Barry Gills points out that "low-intensity democracy" is a form of "cosmetic
democratisation" that serves "as an euphemism for sophisticated modern form of neoauthoritarianism,"66 due to it's compatibility with an "unjust and even oppressive, domestic political
order."67
While "democracy"68 is a universal principle within international law,69 there is no "right to
58 Steven Wheatley, The Democratic Legitimacy of International Law 18 (Hart Publishing, 2010).
59 Martti Koskenniemi, The Fate of Pubic International Law: Between Technique and Politics, 70 Mod. L. Rev.
1, 16 (2007).

60 Wheatley, supra note 51, at 2.
61 Gerry Simpson argues that "liberal anti-pluralism" undermines the inclusive conception of the UN Charter

62

63
64

65
66
67
68

liberalism (sovereign equality of diverse states), because it determines the status of states by their
adherence or non-adherence to certain individual rights and international norms. Simpson, supra note 53 at
542-543 (2001). Kennedy, supra note 53.
An example is Joseph Schumpeter's influential definition of democracy as a "political method [...] a certain
type of institutional arrangement for arriving at political - legislative and administrative - decisions." He
defines the democratic method as "institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which
individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote." See
Schumpeter, supra note 21, at 269.
Kennedy, supra note 53.
The concept of "low-intensity democracy," free and fair multi-party elections and rights of political
participation, is inspired by Joseph Schumpeter's idea of democracy. See Schumpeter, supra note 21. Gills
supra note 57, at 3. Susan Marks, The Riddle of all Constitutions: International Law, Democracy and the
Critique of Ideology, 96 Am. J. Int'l L. 264, 265 (2002) (book review). Thomas Carothers, Empirical
Perspectives on the Emerging Norm of Democracy in International Law, 86 Pro. Am. Soc'y Int'l L. 264
(1992).
With respect to the liberal state, I refer to Anne-Marie Slaughter's definition. See Slaughter, supra note 11.
Marks, supra note 8, at 63.
Gills, supra note 57, at 21, 5.
Marks, supra note 53. Marks, supra note 64, at 265.
There is no general accepted definition of democracy. For instance, the UN makes no reference to
democracy in its Charter. However, the GA broadly referred to democracy as "based on the freely expressed
will of people to determine their own political, economic, social and cultural systems and their full
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democratic governance" in international law, 70 although, elements of such a right, including political
self-determination as well as freedoms of political participation, are stipulated in international human
rights law. 71 In this regard, Susan Marks points out that democratic governance is not only about
legitimating a government by other states as argued by Christian Tomuschat and others.72 Rather it is
about self-government, in the sense of political self-determination that people freely determine their
political status without the intervention, manipulation or interference of a third state. In other words,
democracy entails "an ongoing call to enlarge the opportunities for popular participation in political
processes and end social practices that systematically marginalize some citizens while empowering
others." 73
Similar to David Held, Susan Marks notes that while institutions and procedures of representative
government are significant, they are not the exclusive determining feature of democracy.74
Accordingly, democracy can not be equated with a particular "institutional structure or constitutional
arrangements, not even to any consensus with respect to a wide range of values and beliefs."75
Rather democracy refers to "the basic democratic ideas of popular self-government and political
equality, ideas which are universal, not in the sense that they will or should be uniformly interpreted
and realized, but in the sense that they circulate globally and play a part in political life across the
world." 76

A. Legal Concept of People's Right to Self-Determination
The right to self-determination was merely a political concept until the Second World War.77 Despite its
codification in the UN Charter, self-determination was subordinated to the right to territorial integrity78
and the general commitment to ensuring peace and security in the post war international system.79
Thus, the Charter refers in Article 1(2) and 55 only broadly to "self-determination of peoples" 80 as
principle and necessary precondition to create "peaceful and friendly relations among nations." 81
In order to complement the Charter provisions, the General Assembly (GA) adopted several

69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81

participation in all aspects of their lives." See G.A. Res. 60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/60/1 (September 16, 2005).
Schraeder, supra note 57, at 1001. Marks, supra note 53, at 1001.
Wheatley, supra note 58, at 219.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) Annex, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/2200(XXI) Annex (Dec. 16, 1966). Wheatley, supra note 54, at 220.
Marks, supra note 64, at 265. Marks, supra note 8.
Marks, supra note 64, at 266.
David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance
(Stanford University Press, 1995). Marks, supra note 64, at 266.
Marks, supra note 8, at 4.
Id. at 4.
Jean Salmon, Internal Aspect of the Right to Self-Determination: Towards a Democratic Legitimacy
Principle?, in Modern Law of Self-Determination 253 (Christian Tomuschat ed., 1993).
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
U.N. Charter ch. VII. Gerry Simpson, The Diffusion of Sovereignty: Self-determination in the Post-Colonial
Age, Stan. J. Int'l. L. 255, 266 (1996).
U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2.
U.N. Charter art. 55.

9

resolutions as regards self-determination, decolonization and non-self-governing territories. 82 An
important contribution in this regard is Resolution 1514 (XV). 83 The Resolution enunciates "the
necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and
manifestations," and declares that "[a]ll peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that
right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development."84 Thus, in the context of decolonization, peoples in territories "which have not yet
attained independence" 85 were allowed the exercise of self-determination through the establishment of
an independent state, the free association with or integration to another state. 86 Accordingly, the right
to self-determination of peoples subjected to colonialism was considered to be exhausted "as soon as
the dependent territory achieved independence from the colonial power."87 It was therefore unclear
whether the principle of self-determination had developed to a legal right and therefore, whether it
included legal obligations for states beyond the context of decolonization.88
Ever since, the legal concept of self-determination has continued to evolve in terms of its status
and its scope: First, the right to self-determination has widely been recognized as obligation erga
omnes. 89 Second, as to its scope, the right to self-determination has developed with respect to an
internal and external dimension. The external dimension refers to peoples' right to "choose their
international political status, and applies in the context of colonial and trust territories; 90 and [...] also in
the context of territories subject to belligerent occupation 91." 92 In contrast, the internal dimension
"applies in all contexts to uphold the right of peoples to choose their national constitution, and set their
national goals, without either outside interference or domestic coercion."93
1. External Right to Self-Determination
In the context of decolonization the right to self-determination is depicted as the right of "colonial
82 van den Driest, supra note 24, at 32.
83 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), at 67,
84

85
86
87
88
89
90
91

92
93

U.N. Doc. A/RES/1514 (Dec. 14, 1960).
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), at
67, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1514 (Dec. 14, 1960). Declaration on Principles of Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the UN, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc.
A/RES/2625 (Oct. 24, 1970).
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), at
67, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1514 (Dec. 14, 1960).
G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/1541 (Dec. 15, 1960).
van den Driest, supra note 24, at 32. Helen Quane, The United Nations and the Evolving Right to SelfDetermination, 47 Int'l. Comp. L. Q. 537, 554 (1998).
van den Driest, supra note 24 at 32.
See supra note 32.
These include West Irian in 1962-63, South West Africa/Namibia in 1967 and 1989-90, Western Sahara in
1991 and East Timor between 1999 and 2002. Ralph Wilde, international Territorial Administration: How
Trusteeship and Civilizing Mission Never Went Away 188 (Oxford University Press, 2008).
For example, Israel's occupation of the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, as well as the US
occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq are deemed to belligerent occupations. Nehal Butha, The Antinomies of
Transformative Occupation, 16 Eur. J. Int'l. L. 721, 722 (2005). Martti Koskenniemi, Occupied Zone: "A Zone
of Reasonableness?," 41 Isr. L. Rev. 13, 16 (2008).
Marks, supra note 8, at 113.
Antonio Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples, in The International Bill of Rights: The Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights 92 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981). Marks, supra note 8, at 113.
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peoples" 94 in non-self governing territories to a particular process: 95 the right to freely "determine their
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development."96 Hence, the right
provides for peoples subject to colonial rule to freely choose the international political status of the
territory they inhabit within their colonial boundaries (uti possidetis), 97 whether to establish their own
sovereign independent state or to freely associate with or integrate in an independent state. 98
Underlying the "free choice" to self-determination are "forms and procedures" that must ensure a
free (i.e., without outside intervention, manipulation or interference) and genuine (i.e., be the will of the
people of the territory)99 expression 100 of the will of a people. 101 Moreover, in absence of "special
circumstances," 102 "informed and democratic processes," 103 for instance, through a referendum or a
plebiscite, must ensure the "free choice" of a people.104 Thus, "what amounts to a 'free choice' is not to
be universally predetermined but rather must be judged according to the particular political desires of
the particular people."105
Due to the special status of non-self-governing territories, 106 in contrast to the territory of the states
that administer them,107 the right of a people to define its international political status is consumed as

94 "Colonial peoples" may be defined as a population inhabiting a territory which is geographically separate

95
96
97

98

99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106

107

from the country administering it; is ethnically and/or culturally distinct from the administering country's
population; and has not yet attained full self-government. See G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), Principles IV, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/1541 (Dec. 15, 1960).
Catriona Drew, The East Timor Story: International Law on Trail, 12 Eur. J. Int'l. L. 651, 658-659 (2001).
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), at 67,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/1514 (Dec. 14, 1960).
Likewise, in the Frontier Dispute case the International Court of Justice states that uti possidetis is not
incompatible with self-determination, because the latter does not pose a challenge to existing state borders.
Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 566 (Dec. 22). Jens E. Rytter, Self-Determination of
Colonial Peoples - The Case of Greenland Revisited, 77 Nordic J.Int'l. L. 365, 367 (2008). Rosalyn Higgins,
Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use it 122 (Clarendon Press, 1994).
Free integration or association with an independent state, however, had to be "the result of a free and
voluntary choice by the peoples of the territory concerned expressed through informed and democratic
processes." (Principle VII (a) and IX (b). Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries
and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), at 67, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1514 (Dec. 14, 1960). Salmon, supra note 1, at
255.
Gentian Zyberi, Self-Determination through the Lens of the International Court of Justice, 56 Neth. Int'l. L.
Rev. 429, 438 (2009).
Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 55, 59 (Oct. 16). M.A.Shukri, The Concept of Selfdetermination in the United Nations 60, 152, 337 (Al Jadidah Press, 1965).
Drew, supra note 95, at 661. Rytter, supra note 97, at 367.
In his separate opinion Vice-President provides an example of "special circumstances," which include the
legitimate struggle for liberation from foreign domination. Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 99
(Oct. 16) (separate opinion of Judge Ammoun).
G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/1541 (Dec. 15, 1960).
In the context of decolonization, the UN practice has been to organize or supervise self-determination
referenda and plebiscites. Antonio Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal 76-78
(Cambridge University Press, 1999). Drew, supra note 95, at 662.
Drew, supra note 95, at 661, 662.
"The territory of a colony or other Non-Self-Governing territory has [...] a status separate and distinct from the
territory of the state administering it;and [...] shall exist until the people of the colony or Non-Self-Governing
Territory have exercised their right of self-determination [...]. Declaration on Principles of International Law
concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations: G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/8082 (Oct. 24, 1970).
Rytter, supra note 97, at 368. Cassese, supra note 104, at 72-73. Micha Pomerance, Self-Determination in
Law and Practice 9, 25 (Martinus Nijhoff, 1982).
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soon as it is exercised. 108 However, while the right to the process of self-determination is not ongoing,
it "does not exhaust the content of the right to self-determination."109 In other words, there are
"additional substantive entitlements beyond the basic right of a people to exercise a free choice" in the
decolonization context, for instance, the "right to exist - demographically and territorially - as a
people." 110 Moreover, GA Resolution 1514 (XV) makes a specific provision to the right to territorial
integrity.111 Further provisions are made with respect to the right to permanent sovereignty over
natural resources, 112 the right to cultural integrity and development,113 and the right to economic and
social development.

114

In the South West Africa Decolonization case the ICJ also linked the right to

self-determination with the respect for fundamental human rights, particularly, through its
condemnation of the practice of apartheid.115 Self-determination was also applied to the South African
apartheid and the Southern Rhodesian crisis.116 Therefore, the colonial definition of self-determination
was expanded to include a racial element, because the salt-water definition of colonialism was not
applicable: neither the white elite of South Africa nor Rhodesia was connected to an European colonial
power. 117 Accordingly, the meaning of colonization as "alien subjugation, domination and
exploitation"118 is not confined to the colonial context, but "seems to cover all situations where a
foreign [ = European]119 minority imposes its rule on the majority."120
In contrast, the colonial definition of self-determination "was defined as the majority right to external
108 Rytter, supra note 97, at 368.
109 Drew, supra note 95, at 663.
110 Catriona Drew, Self-Determination, Population Transfer and the Middle East Peace Accords, in Human
111
112

113
114
115

116
117
118
119

120

Rights, Self-Determination and Political Change in the Occupied Palestinian Territories 133 (Stephen Bowen
ed., 1997).
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), at
67, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1514 (Dec. 14, 1960).
G.A. Res. 1803 (XVI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/1803 (Dec. 14, 1962). International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966). International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI) (Dec. 16,
1966).
Universal Declaration of Rights of Peoples art. 2, 9, 13, 14 and 15 (July 14, 1976).
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI)
(Dec. 16, 1966). International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), art.
1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966).
The International Court of Justice states that "to establish [...] and to enforce, distinctions, exclusions,
restrictions and limitations exclusively based on grounds of race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin
which constitute a denial of fundamental human rights is a flagrant violation of the purposes and principles of
the Charter." See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J.
57 (June 21). Zyberi, supra note 99, at 435 (2009).
Simpson, supra note 79, at 273.
Id.
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), U.N.
Doc. A/RES/1514 (Dec. 14, 1960).
For examples, religious or racially discriminating ruling elites in Eritrea, East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and
Biafra were not considered as colonial regimes although the indigenous peoples regarded them as such.
Pomerance, supra note 102, at 73-76. Benyamin Neuberger, National Self-determination in Post-colonial
Africa 85 (Lynne Rienner Publishers,1986).
Beyond the colonial context, the GA applied the notion of colonization, for instance, in respect of Palestine,
the South African majoritarian population and the Cambodian people. G.A. Res. ES-7/2, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/ES-7/1A (July 29, 1980). G.A. Res. 42/43, U.N. Doc. A/RES/42/43 (Nov. 20, 1987). G.A. Res. 46/18,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/18 (Nov. 20, 1991). Martti Koskenniemi, National Self-Determination Today: Problems
of Legal Theory and Practice, 43 Int'l. Comp. L. Q. 241, 247 (1994).
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independence from colonial domination" by European colonial rule.121 As such, self-determination was
“primarily designed to foster the decolonization process,” 122 and thereby ending European
colonialism. 123 Therefore, self-determination was not applicable to "ethnic groups within these
territories or to majorities who were being oppressed by indigenous 'alien' elites" nor did it include
secession or democratic representation.124 Accordingly, self-determination evolved upon the premise
that as principle it is "fundamentally subordinated to the principle of state sovereignty, including
territorial integrity of the state,125 which was and continues to be the basic pillar of international law" in
a state-centered system.126
As recent cases such as Kosovo127 and Chechnya 128 have illustrated, it remains controversial
whether there is "any legal right to secession under international law - even in situations involving
gross human rights abuse." 129 On the other hand, the notion of internal self-determination that refers to
internal entitlements within a state, has contributed to the association of the right to self-determination
with democracy in view of the need to accommodate the rights and claims of inhabitants within a
territory. In this regard, "the articulation of self-determination as a human right" that has to be in line
with other individual human rights, may be explanatory for the development of internal selfdetermination as an alternative to external self-determination. 130
2. Internal Dimension of Self-Determination
Both ICCPR and ICESCR define self-determination as "human right" in Article 1. In its first paragraph
the Article recognizes this right: "All peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right
they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development."131 However, the Covenants do not clarify who the "peoples" are upon which the right to

121 Simpson, supra note 79, at 273.
122 Christian Tomuschat, Secession and Self-Determination, in Secession: International Law Perspectives 23
123
124
125
126
127

128
129
130

131

(Marcelo G. Kohen ed., 2006).
Simpson, supra note at 79, at 255.
Id. at 273-274.
Higgins, supra note 97, at 121.
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 1. Rytter, supra note 97, at 367.
The Security Council resolutions on Kosovo called for "substantial autonomy," and meaningful selfadministration" rather than secession thereby affirming the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia. S.C. Res.1160, para. 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1160 (Mar. 31, 1998). S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. doc.
S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999). However, in 2008 Kosovo declared independence. While 85 UN member
states recognize Kosovo's independence, Serbia refuses to recognize Kosovo's unilateral secession.
See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Secretary General:
The Situation of Human Right in the Republic of Chechnya of the Russian Federation, U.N. Doc. HR/99/104
(Nov. 16, 1999).
Drew, supra note 95, at 657. Secession as remedy of last resort for gross human rights abuse is discussed,
for instance, by Lee C. Buchheit. See Lee C. Buchheit, Legitimacy of Self-Determination (Yale University
Press, 1978).
Matthew Saul, The Normative Status of Self-Determination in International Law: A Formula for Uncertainty in
the Scope and Content of the Right? Hum. Rts. L. Rev. (forthcoming). S. James Anaya, Self-Determination
as a Collective Human Right under Contemporary International Law, in Operationalising the Right of
Indigenous Peoples to Self-Determination 12 (Pekka Aikio & Martin Scheinin eds., 2000).
G.A. Res. 1803 (XVI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/1803 (Dec. 14, 1962). International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966). International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI) (Dec. 16,
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self-determination is conferred. Particularly, it is unclear "whether 'peoples' is a category
distinguishable from 'states' on the one hand or 'individuals' on the other." 132
The UN Charter refers with respect to self-determination only to peoples of states
non-self-governing and trust territories.

134

133

and peoples of

In compliance with the use of "peoples" in the Charter, the

term has generally been limited to the application to entities, which already have "attributes of
sovereignty or statehood." 135 However, this means that the historical European definition of
sovereignty as effective control of territory continues to marginalize claims to sovereignty by other
groups than the "people" of the state, not least because such claims would pose a challenge to the
territorial integrity of the existing state.136 Accordingly, minorities are not granted a right to selfdetermination.
This differentiation between minorities and "peoples" is also reflected in the ICCPR. Article 27 on
minorities states the following: "[i]n those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist,
persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other
members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use
their own language." 137 Accordingly, the right to self-determination is not conferred upon minorities.
The Article only mentions "rights essential to the defense of minority identity in the face of
assimilationist pressures: it encapsulates their 'right to an identity'."138 Moreover, these rights do not
provide a minority for a collective right, rather the Article refers to "persons belonging to such
minorities" upon which these rights are conferred.139 Accordingly, Article 27 seems to "impose only a
duty of toleration on states, a duty of non-interference with the cultural and religious practices" of
minorities. 140
Even though the Covenants do not refer to minorities as "peoples" and they are thus not the formal
subject of the right to self-determination, this does not mean that self-determination is not relevant to
them.141 For instance, the Human Rights Committee (HRC) highlights that "the right of selfdetermination is of particular importance because its realization is an essential condition for the

1966).

132 Simpson, supra note 79, at 268.
133 "To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self134
135
136

137
138
139
140
141

determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace." See U.N.
Charter art. 1, para. 2.
U.N. Charter ch. XI & ch. XII.
Elena Cirkovic, Self-Determination and Indigenous Peoples in International Law, 31 Am. Ind. L. Rev. 375,
387 (2007).
In this respect, sovereignty was tied to the principle of self-determination, which Woodrow Wilson carried
forward to “justify the creation of new nation-states out of the multi-ethnic empires in Europe and the Middle
East” following the end of the first World War. Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und
Völkerrecht, Recht zwischen Umbruch und Bewahrung 180 (Springer-Verlag, 1995). Cirkovic, supra note
135, at 387.
G.A. Res. 1803 (XVI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/1803 (Dec. 14, 1962). International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), art. 27, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966).
Patrick Thornberry, Self-Determination, Minorities, Human Rights: A Review of International Instruments, 38
Int'l. Comp.L. Q. 867, 880 (1989).
Id.
Id. at 881.
Id. at 883.
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effective guarantee and observance of individual human rights." 142 This implies a dialectic relationship
between the protection of individual rights that benefit all within a state including minorities on the one
hand, and the exercise of self-determination of a people on the other. Consequently, a violation of
individual rights is ultimately also a violation of self-determination. Equally, people's right to exercise
self-determination is not without limitation, because it is connected with the "effective guarantee and
observance of individual rights."
Despite the reference to internal self-determination as human right, self-determination is not an
"absolute right" as Article 5(1) of the Covenants illustrates: "nothing in the present Covenant may be
interpreted as implying for any state, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any
act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognized herein."143 Hence the
exercise of the right to self-determination "must be balanced with other human rights, such as freedom
of expression and freedom of religion."144 In this respect, it is important to note that the responsibility to
balance self-determination and other human rights in the human rights framework is solely allocated to
the state. 145 On the one hand, the responsibility to balance rights provides states with a legal device
"to evade what might be deemed, from their perspective, non-desirable implications of [the right to
self-determination]."146 On the other hand, this also directs "attention to the organization of the state as
a whole and how that organization favors or disfavors human values to the benefit of all within the
state, minorities included."147
a. Political Self-Determination
Both ICCPR and ICESCR make reference to political self-determination in common Article 1 as
substantive entitlement to the exercise of the right to self-determination: "[a]ll peoples have the right to
self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status." 148 In contrast to
external self-determination in the decolonization context, the "free choice" of a people is not concerned
with the determination of the international political status of the territory, but with "the system of
government and administration, as well as the substantive nature of [the] political regime.149 More
explicitly, political self-determination requires that the "political order reflects the will of the people.”150
As regards the outcome of the free choice of a people, the GA Resolution 2625 linked the exercise
of self-determination to the requirement of "a government representing the whole people belonging to
142 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 12: The Right to Self-Determination of Peoples (Art. 1),
(1984), http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/comments.htm.

143 G.A. Res. 1803 (XVI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/1803 (Dec. 14, 1962). International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), art. 5, para. 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966).

144 Saul, supra note 130.
145 Robert McCorquodale, Self-Determination: A Human Rights Approach, 43 Int'l. Comp. L. Q. 857, 878 (1994).
146 Saul, supra note 130. On mechanisms for enforcement of self-determination under ICCPR see Alex Conte &
147
148
149
150

Scott Davidson, et al., Defining Civil and Political Rights: The Jurisprudence of the United Nations 33
(Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2004).
Thornberry, supra note 138, at 884.
G.A. Res. 1803 (XVI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/1803 (Dec. 14, 1962). International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), art. 5, para. 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966).
Steven Wheatley, The Security Council, Democratic Legitimacy and Regime Change in Iraq, 17 Eur. J. Int'l.
L. 531, 540 (2006).
S. James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law 81 (Oxford University Press, 1996).
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the territory without distinction as to race, creed or color."151 The necessity that the government must
be of non-discriminative and representative nature is also reflected in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR) that provides in Article 21(3) that "[t]he will of the people shall be the basis of
the authority of government."152
The exercise of political self-determination therefore postulates that a people is "allowed to exercise
those rights and freedoms which permit the expression of the popular will."153 Political selfdetermination is thus a continuous entitlement to the expression of the popular will and therefore, it is
to be considered as a "manifestation of the totality of rights embodied in the [ICCPR]."154
The right to participate in the political decision-making process is decisive for the exercise of
political self-determination. In the context of citizenship, Hannah Arendt refers to the right to participate
as "right to have rights," 155 indicating that all other possible rights presuppose membership in a
political community."156 Moreover, for Arendt, equality is an essential attribute of citizenship that
individuals "acquire upon entering in the public realm" and which has to be secured by democratic
institutions. 157 That means that decisions, which affect particular groups within a state "should be
taken, at the very least, with those groups have been consulted." 158 In other words, "it it is not enough
to have a collection of private individuals voting separately and anonymously according to their [rather]
private opinions".159 Rather private individuals must be able to meet as "subjects of democratic
debate" in a public-political space 160 in order to articulate their differences and commonalities. 161
Political participation may be considered as procedural entitlement of self-determination. On the
one hand, the right to participate empowers a people to take part in the political decision-making
process and to decides on who to be entrusted with political power. On the other hand, through
political participation a people defines and re-defines its public sphere including the system of
government and the nature of the political regime. Hence, the public sphere may be considered as
substance of self-determination. As such it is neither universal, nor a "natural predisposition," but
artificial and constructed, in the sense that the decision on its content requires the political dispute of
people.
Popular participation in the political decision-making process can be directly or indirectly exercised:
151 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
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"The notion of direct participation primarily refers to the right to stand for election for the purpose of
creating a representative government, while the notion of indirect participation generally refers to
periodic voting processes in order to elect the political representative of the people." 162 In Article 25 on
political participation the ICCPR affirms that right:
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely
chosen representatives;
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing
the free expression of the will of the electors;
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his
163
country.
Article 25 on political participation unequivocally implicates the respect for Article 18 on the right to
freedom of expression, and Article 19 and 21 of the ICCPR on the right to peaceful assembly and the
freedom of association.164 Freedom of thought and the right to peaceful assembly as well as the
freedom of association are possible means of implementing the procedural aspect of political selfdetermination.165 Without the guarantee of these rights, the right to participate in the political decisionmaking process would be meaningless. In addition, the exercise of the right to political selfdetermination requires that the government represents the authority or will of its population as a
whole. 166 Hence, "the implementation of the right to [political] self-determination is inextricably linked to
the principle of equal rights of peoples167 and, more in particular, the principle of non-discrimination."168
The right to self-determination is often described as inalienable and ongoing.169 This implies that a
people can change and constitute its own system of government and decide on the nature of the
political regime. 170 Further, "a representative government should allow its people to participate
continuously in the general decision-making process of the state, in this way substantively - not merely
formally - determining not only its political, but also economic, social and cultural development."171 In
this regard the HRC notes that "[s]tates parties should describe to the constitutional and political

162 Sarah Joseph & Jenny Schultz, et al., The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases,
Materials, and Commentary 501-511 (Oxford University Press 2000). van den Driest, supra note 24.
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process which in practice allow the exercise of [self-determination]." 172 Therefore, policy outcomes of
the government "may function as a continuous measuring instrument for qualifying a political system
as participatory and representative, and for checking whether the core meaning of the right to internal
self-determination is compiled with."173 In a nutshell, the right to internal self-determination in the postcolonial context empowers the population of a state to participate on an equal basis in the political
decision-making process and to determine "persons to be entrusted with political power", the system
of government as well as nature of the political regimes174 without the intervention of a third state and
without the manipulation or the interference of current political authorities.175
b. Economic, Social and Cultural Development
Common Article 1 the ICCPR and ICESCR stipulates the right of all peoples to: "freely pursue their
economic, social and cultural development."

176

Likewise, the UDHR proclaims in Article 22 that

"everyone, as a member of society [...] is entitled to realization [...] in accordance with the organization
and resources of each state, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity
and the free development for his personality."177 Moreover, common Article 1(2) of the ICCPR and
ICESCR provides:
All peoples may, for their own end, freely dispose of their natural wealth and
resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international
economic cooperation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and
international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means or
subsistence. 178
This provision implies that in order to enable peoples' economic, social and cultural development, the
natural wealth and resources of peoples must be used "for their own ends." Therefore, the authority in
charge with overseeing peoples' natural wealth must use these resources to benefit the peoples on an
equal basis. 179 In addition, for peoples to exercise the right to economic self-determination, peoples
need to be able to "freely dispose" of their natural wealth. The right to free disposition is thus an
requirement to enforcing the use of resources for peoples' own collective ends. 180 Accordingly, peoples
may not be deprived of their own resources, for instance by "forces outside the control of the
community."181 Hence, treaties promoting international economic cooperation may not oppose this
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right as stipulated in common Article 1(2). 182
Resources relate in this context to peoples "own means or subsistence" that include "everything
which is crucial in order to uphold life, of which food is an essential element." 183 Given that "[i]n no
case may a people be deprived of its own means of substance," 184 there is an ongoing and inherent
right of peoples to mutually benefit from economic development as stated in Article 25 of the ICESCR:
"[n]othing in the present Covenant shall be interpreted as impairing the inherent right of all peoples to
enjoy and utilize fully and freely their natural wealth and resources." 185 The GA Resolution 41/128 on
development restates this obligation by indicating that the right to development is "an inalienable
human right by virtue of which every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in,
contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights
and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized."186
Self-determination also requires that peoples have the right to participate "in matters touching upon
all spheres of life [such as the use of their resources] on a continuous basis." 187 Thus, the authority
controlling peoples' resources must enable peoples' participation in the decision-making processes
and must be therefore of representative nature.188 Moreover, self-determination requires that the
organization of the state "be one under which people may live and develop freely on a continuous
basis." 189 In this regard, Article 28 of the UDHR stipulates that “everyone is entitled to a social and
international order in which the rights and freedom set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.”190
This establishes that the respect for human rights “is not a narrowly focused obligation applying only
within strict limits to relations between individuals and their states, but rather is an open-ended
obligation applying to all societal relations whether at the local, national or international level.” 191 To
sum up, the organization of the state is not only relevant to the exercise of political self-determination
and to "freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development," but also to the guarantee of
individual human rights such as the right to adequate food, 192 which benefit all individuals within the
state.
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III. EGYPT'S POST-COLONIAL APPROACHES TO INTERNAL SELF-DETERMINATION
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have been described as exceptional, due to the fact that
following the end of the Cold War, the authoritarian states within this region have been largely
unaffected by the "third wave of democratization.”193 On the contrary Western Europe, Latin America
and many former Communist states are considered to constitute democracies. 194 However, the extent
to which these regimes are indeed democratic, is debatable,195 considering that, being rather formally
than substantively democratic, they have often failed “to broaden popular political participation.”196
Therefore, it is an “overstated universalism” to proclaim democratic governance as a global norm,
given that outside Europe and Latin America perhaps, “there is little evidence of any trend towards
democracy.”197 Nevertheless, “democracy” is promoted as “the best of all possible worlds both by the
holders of global power and by 'the people,' not least by those struggling for social justice and selfdetermination.”198
In the “post-Cold War world” the promotion of liberal democracy resembles the foreign policy
strategy, which Western states have applied, “albeit unevenly, as early as the 19th century, primarily
within the context of colonization.”199 Considering political economic development as being principally
determined by endogenous factors, economic liberalization is seen as necessary condition for political
liberalization and the deconstruction of authoritarianism. 200 As political equivalent of the free market,
liberal democracy is assumed to be the “necessary and natural product of submission to the rationality
of the worldwide market,” 201
Egypt constitutes a case in point,202 given that efforts to impose economic policies date back to the
1870s. 203 In this respect, the establishment of the Egyptian Republic in 1953, has not ended the
impact of Western economic and political influence. Despite the efforts of economic liberalization in the
1970s, democratization has been rather limited and authoritarianism remarkable enduring. The
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popular demonstrations that started in 2011 have been particularly directed against the autocratic
regime. The political demand of the protesters that “the people want the overthrow of the regime,”204 is
thereby not limited to the removal of the autocrats, but likewise entails the desire for the recapture of
the political sphere to internal self-determination.
Against this background, the following examines the post-colonial 205 approaches taken to political
and economic self-determination since the establishment of the Egyptian Republic. In this regard, the
following not only illustrates the obstacles to democratization in the context of economic and political
domination, but also constitutes a critical response to the conditions of the world system.

A. Political Self-Determination
1. Authoritarianism under Nasser and Sadat
Egypt formally gained independence in 1922, however, continued to remain under British military
occupation and influence. In 1952 a group of Egyptian military officers carried out a regime change,
which resulted in the overthrow of the monarchy and the ousting of the British military.206
Consequently, the 1923 Constitution was abrogated and Egypt was declared a republic.
The new military regime under President Nasser moved Egypt towards "a secular Pan-Arab
nationalist project combined with a Third World import-substitution vision of economic
development."207 Contrary to the monarchy under which multi-partyism and political rights were
guaranteed by the 1923 Constitution, political liberalization and democratization were subordinated to
the achievement of socio-economic development.208 For Nasser, political pluralism posed a threat to
national stability and unity,209 given that under the monarchy, the King and the British had furthered
their own interests through arbitrary interventions in the political process. 210 Therefore, in 1953 all
parties were banned and a one-party system established in which the Liberation Rally (LR)
represented the only legal political organization. As such, the LR had the mandate to mobilize the
masses to support the “revolution” and to de-legitimize the monarchy.211 The LR was later changed to
the National Union (NU) and in 1962, the NU was replaced by the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) which
continued to be the only political party until 1976. Like the LR, the NU as well as the ASU were used
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as instrument for "mass political mobilization and indoctrination."212
In an attempt to consolidate its control, the regime established several exceptional courts such as
the Court of Treason in 1952, the Court of the Revolution in 1953, and the People's Court in 1954.213
Because of their far-reaching mandates, limited procedural guidelines and lack of appeals process,
these courts served the regime to sidestep the regular court system.214 Moreover, in view of the
increasing pressure on the part of the Lawyers' Syndicate and the Judges' Association for judicial and
political reforms, Nasser issued an executive decree, which prompted the dismissal of several judges
of the Court of Cassation and judicial officials as well as the dissolution of the board of Judges'
Association.215 With the objective to eliminate any further resistance, the Supreme Council of Judicial
Organizations was established, which gave the executive power extensive control over appointments,
promotions as well as disciplinary actions in the judiciary.216
The new Constitution of 1958 provided for some political participation. For instance, it ensured a
presidential system in which the President was to be confirmed by referendum.217 However, the
Constitution also guaranteed the President's monopoly of power. Articles 65, 111 and 131, for
example, stipulated that while the National Assembly (NA) "was in charge of the legislative power, the
president had the right to dissolve the legislature and issue laws-by-decree." 218 Furthermore, all
candidates who run in the elections for the NA had to receive the approval of the NU, which was
chaired by President. Accordingly, the control over the NU and the NA was centralized in the hands of
the President,219 which meant that "the parliament lost its autonomy and became totally subordinate to
the executive power." 220
After the merger between Egypt and Syria into the United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1958, the UAR
was dissolved in 1961. In 1964 a new Constitution was established. In addition to reinforcing the
commitment to Arab socialism, the Constitution provided the President with excessive power. For
instance, the President “retained the power to appoint and dismiss government ministers and to lay
down the general policy of the state in all fields and supervise its implementation.”221 Although the
President's powers in the legislative sphere were confined to periods of the NA's adjournment, 222 such
limitations were bypassed by the almost continuous state of emergency.223
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After president Nasser's death, Sadat became President in 1970. The beginning of his presidency
represented a reorientation of Egyptian politics, in the sense that it constituted a "de-Nasserization."224
In this regard, the introduction of an "open-door policy" including several political and economic
measures, facilitated a partial political and economic liberalization. For instance, the new Constitution
of 1971 guaranteed protection against arbitrary arrest and seizure of property, 225 and provided for the
establishment of an independent Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) in 1979. Mandated with
performing judicial review, the SCC's rulings contributed to the promotion of electoral reform, freedom
of expression, and protected civil society, opposition and human rights groups from state
domination. 226 Although the SCC allowed the opposition and human rights activists to challenge the
regime for the first time since the military coup in 1952, the Court also put constrains on their political
activities. For example, the SCC ruled Egypt's Emergency Security Courts constitutional and delayed
the issuance of the ruling on the constitutionality of the transfer of civilians to Military Courts. 227 Seeing
that Egypt has been ruled under an almost continuous state of emergency since 1967, “the
Emergency State Security Courts and, more recently, the Military Courts, have effectively formed a
parallel legal system with fewer procedural safeguards, serving as ultimate regime check on
challenges to its power.” 228
With respect to the protection of political rights and freedoms, the 1971 Constitution guaranteed, for
instance, the freedom of press in Article 48 and the freedom of expression in Article 47. The
constitution also protected the freedom of peaceful assembly "without the need for prior notice” in
Article 54, and the right to form civil societies in Article 56. 229 However, most of these rights and
freedoms were still defined by law, for example, public meetings, processions and gatherings were
only allowed “within the limits of the law.” 230 Additionally, the Emergency Law prohibited the
organization of public meetings by parties without the Ministry of Interior's prior permission and further
subjected them to the state security forces' supervision.231 The Emergency Law also granted the
President a wide range of powers to censor the media, which allowed for the confiscation and the
closing of newspapers “on the grounds of public safety and national security.” 232 This provided Sadat
with measures to undermine the formal legal protection of the people and to remain in ultimate control
over its opponents when necessary.
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The 1971 Constitution also retained many of the features of the previous constitutions. For
example, it granted the President enough "powers to overshadow and overrule the NA, renamed as
the People's Assembly (PA)."233 In this respect, the ability of the legislature to change the government
or legislation was severely constrained.234 The Constitution further provided for the Socialist
Prosecutor General "whose actual function was to prosecute Sadat's political opponents outside the
main course of the legal system while at the same time looking into corruption cases. 235
Since its establishment in 1962, the ASU continued to be the only political organization until the
creation of three political forums within the framework of the ASU in 1976. These forums included the
Liberal Socialist Forum (the right), Egypt's Arab Socialist Forum (the centre) and the Nationalist
Progressive Unionist Forum (the left).236 In contrast, other major political forces, such as, the Muslim
Brotherhood, the Neutral or the Nasserites were excluded from the ASU.237 Nevertheless, the
recognition of other political trends in the ASU represented a departure from the previous regime
under which the ASU was dominated by Nasser's ideology. 238 All three political forums were allowed to
participate in the elections of the PA in 1976, which therefore were the first plural parliamentary
elections held since the 1952 military coup.239
Following the issuance of Law 40/1977 that allowed for a multi-party system, five political parties
were established. In addition to the forums which were transformed into political parties, in 1978 other
parties were formed including the Neutral Party, the National Democratic Party (NDP), which replaced
Egypt's ruling ASU, and the Socialist Labour Party.240 Despite these democratic measures that
facilitated political participation, Law 40/1977 also introduced restrictions with respect to the formation
and operation of political parties. In this regard, the Committee of Political Parties' Affairs was tasked
with approving newly established parties. The Committee was empowered to "ban the activities of any
political party, if proven that the party or its leaders or members violated the Constitution or did not
abide by its declared program."241 Between 1977 and 2007, the Committee's approval was limited to
four parties, which included the Nation Party in 1983, the National Reconciliation Party in 2000, the
Tomorrow Party in 2004 and the Democratic Front Party in 2007. 242 Other parties that were rejected by
the Committee, for instance, Egypt's Green Party or the Social Justice Party, were established through

233 PA has 454 members: 444 elected by popular vote (400 elected by proportional representation in two-

234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242

member constituencies and 44 elected in single seated constituencies) and 10 appointed by the president.
Maye Kassem, In the Guise of Democratic Governance in Contemporary Egypt 36-37 (Garnet Publishing
Limited, 1999).
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Arab Political Systems: Egypt, 5 (2008),
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2008/03/06/arab-political-systems-baseline-information-andreforms/2nn.
El-Sayed, supra note 212, at 79.
Hamdy Hassan, State versus Society in Egypt: Consolidating Democracy or Upgrading Autocracy, 4 Afr. J.
Pol. Sci. 319, 321 (2010).
Id.
Id.
El-Sayed, supra note 212, at 81.
Hassan, supra note 236, at 321
El-Sayed, supra note 212, at 82.
Id.

24

Administrative Court rulings. 243 Law 40/1977 also prohibited the legalization of parties that were based
on ethnic or religious identities. This provision undermined moderate Islamist movements, such as the
Muslim Brotherhood, to form political parties, in spite of the fact that these movements accounted for
the largest constituency.244 Moreover, while political parties were allowed to issue their own
newspaper, similar to all radio and television services, these newspapers continued to be controlled by
the regime. 245 These restrictions on the freedom of press occasionally resulted in the shutting down of
opposition newspapers that were viewed as “extremist in their criticisms of the regime."246
In consequence of massive food riots against economic policies in 1977, the regime introduced a
series of decrees putting further constrains on political freedoms and rights. 247 For instance, Law
33/1978 empowered the Committee of Political Parties' Affairs "to deprive any person from belonging
to political parties or practising political rights, if it was proven by the Socialist Prosecutor-General that
this person contributed to the corruption of political life in the country, or threatened national unity and
social peace."248 Furthermore, Law 95/1980 made any acts punishable, if they were found to be in
contradiction with morality. In this regard, the criteria of morality were to be determined by the regime.
This provided the government with extraordinary powers "to punish any person or political party that
criticized the president, the ruling party or any other government-related institutions." 249
In 1979 elections for the PA were hold, which resulted in an overwhelming majority for Sadat's NDP
with 330 seats, whereas, for instance, only 29 seats went to the Socialist Labour Party, two to the
Socialist Liberal Party and ten to independents. 250 In 1980 the 1971 Constitution was amended,
introducing a clause that changed the re-election of the President from two terms to an indefinite
number of terms. The constitutional amendments also replaced the unicameral parliamentary system
with a bicameral one through the establishment of the Shura Council (SC)251 in order to complement
the PA.252 Given its solely advisory competencies, the SC possessed no legislative powers, 253 but
served the regime in controlling the media. In this respect, the SC replaced the ASU, which was
abolished in 1979.
Despite the restrictions imposed on political rights and freedoms, the presidency of Sadat
represented a major shift from the military one-party system under President Nasser. In contrast to
Nasser's regime that was directed towards controlling all aspects of political life, Sadat introduced a
process of democratic reform in the mid-1970s that permitted to some extent political participation,
especially, through the formation of political parties. However, in spite of the establishment of a multi243
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party system and the limited guarantee of political rights and freedoms, the regime continued to
oppress its opposition. For instance, following the resistance against the peace treaty with Israel, the
government arrested approximately 1000 opponents from across the entire political spectrum. 254 This
has also often been viewed as resulting in Sadat's assassination by an Islamist military officer in
1981. 255 Overall, while the existence of multi-partyism and elections provided for some measures of
participation, these were rather formal than substantive in nature, as they neither allowed the people to
participate in the decision-making process of the state, nor in determining the nature of the political
system.
2. Mubarak's Democratic Exceptionalism
Mubarak came into power in 1981. Although Mubarak renewed the state of emergency in response to
Sadat's assassination, his regime demonstrated relative tolerance towards political parties in the
1980s. 256 For example, political prisoners were released and political parties that had been banned or
suspended under the Sadat's regime, were allowed to resume their political activities and
participation.257 Moreover, moderate Islamist movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, were
permitted to participate in the PA elections via alliances with legal political parties. Likewise, they were
granted the right to publish newspapers and to voice their opposition in the media.258
Following the amendment of the 1972 Electoral Law, a system of proportional representation was
established in 1983. Based on this system, political parties had to submit a list of candidates for each
of the 48 constituencies.259 In this regard, the representation of political parties in the PA was
dependent on whether these parties had succeeded in obtaining at least eight percent of the national
vote.260 Consequently, particularly small parties were deprived by the amendment from representation
in the PA. In view of their limited resources, small parties were neither able to provide a list of
candidates for all constituencies, nor to obtain eight percent of the national vote in the elections. The
amendment also banned "independent candidates,” which excluded any candidate without party
affiliation from competing in the elections. 261 In spite of these limitations, the elections for the PA in
1984 were more competitive than previous elections "since the re-introduction of political pluralism in
1977." 262 For example, the Muslim Brotherhood was permitted to compete via alliance with the Neutral
Party. However, given that no other party had passed the eight percent threshold of the national vote,
representation in the PA was limited to the ruling NDP with 390 seats and the Neutral Party in alliance
with the Muslim Brotherhood with 58 seats. 263
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Due to the fact that the banning of independent candidates in the amended Electoral Law of 1983
was considered unconstitutional and in contradiction to individual rights protected in the 1971
Constitution, the SCC declared the PA elections of 1984 invalid. Though, the newly issued amendment
left the system of party list-based elections unchanged, it allowed independent candidates to
participate in the elections. The new elections resulted once more in an overwhelming majority of the
NDP, which won 308 seats. Besides the Neutral Party that won 36 seats, the Labour Party in alliance
with the Muslim Brotherhood, became the largest opposition party with 56 seats, in addition to 48
seats won by independent candidates. 264
A ruling of the SCC in 1990 finally changed the system of party-list based elections and replaced it
with an individual candidacy system "according to which the country was divided into 222 electoral
constituencies with each constituency electing two deputies for the PA."265 This ruling constituted a
major victory for the opposition parties, even though their participation in the electoral process
continued to be restricted by the Emergency Law. Therefore, major opposition parties refused their
participation in the 1990 elections in protest of the Emergency Law. 266 Consequently, the election
resulted in major victory of the NDP with 386 seats. Only five seats were won by the Unionist Party
and 57 seats by independent candidates. 267
In contrast to the constitutional and political processes in the 1980s that had facilitated people's
participation to some extend, a process of "deliberalization" 268 increasingly constrained participation
and political rights in the 1990s. For instance, in 1992 the amendment to the Law of Political Parties
imposed further constrains on the formation of parties. This law barred any political activity on the part
of a party's founding members as long as the new party had not received the approval of the
Committee of Political Parties' Affairs.269 Moreover, a major obstacle to people's ability to participate in
the political process represented the amendment of Law 97/1992 in the Penal Code that widened the
definition of terrorism. The law defined terrorism as "any act that entailed the use of force or the threat
of use of force in order to undermine public order and threaten social peace and security."270
Additionally, the amendment stipulated harsher penalties, for example, acts of terrorism were referred
to the Supreme State Security and the Military Courts whose rulings were not subject to appeal, could
entail death penalty or hard labour and could be altered or dismissed by the President. 271
The government also amended the law governing civil society organizations. "Since Nasser, the
mandate and activities of civil society organizations had been regulated by Law 32/1964, which
brought all civil societies activities under the control of […] the Ministry of Social Affairs (MOSA)."272 In
accordance with this law, all non-governmental organizations (NGOs) had to register with the MOSA,
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which was empowered to deny the registration of any NGO “whose objectives were regarded as a
threat to the security and social order of the republic."273 In 1999, the government issued Law 153 to
govern the activities of civil society organizations, which was changed to Law 84 in 2002.274 Generally,
the law provided MOSA with more oversight authority over the activities of civil society organizations.
For instance, the law "barred NGOs from receiving funding from any foreign donor, collecting
donations from the public, or carrying out fund-raising activities without prior permission” from the
Ministry."275 Further, the law prohibited NGOs from engaging in any political activity "covered by laws
governing political parties or any activity that was political in nature." 276
As a result of the restrictions on political activities and the high level of regime interference in the
electoral process through fraud and repression, 277 the 1995 elections for the PA resulted in a major
victory for the NDP. 278 Given that these elections had not been supervised by public sector officials not
by judges, the SCC declared the elections invalid. Even though, the following PA elections were
conducted under the supervision of judges, this did not prevent the regime from interfering in the
electoral process. "The judges were in control inside the polling stations, however outside the stations,
security forces harassed opposition candidates and voters and arrested many candidates” belonging
to opposition groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood.279 As a consequence, the NDP won the
elections with 172 seats and 216 additional seats won by independent candidates that joined the ruling
party. 280 Only seven seats were won by the Neutral Party and 37 seats went to independent
candidates including 17 seats that were obtained by the Muslim Brotherhood.281
In 2005 Mubarak's regime introduced additional changes to the Constitution including an
amendment to Article 76 allowing for multiple presidential candidates.282 Despite the establishment of
a system of competitive presidential elections, the requirements for the candidate eligibility continued
to be restricted. In this regard, only parties that had existed for at least five years and had won at least
three percent of the seats in PA and SC, were allowed to nominate a presidential candidate.283 This
prevented "any party from nominating a popular figure outside the small circle of mostly elderly, wellknown politicians."284 In addition, Law 76/2005 required that each candidate had to be approved by at
least 250 members of the PS, SC and local council. 285 Considering that these institution were mainly
controlled by the ruling NDP, the amended law deprived independent candidates from competing in
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the presidential elections. 286
The first multi-candidate presidential elections were held in 2005. Although ten candidates
competed in the elections, Mubarak succeeded in winning the election with 88 percent of the vote.287
Likewise, in the PA elections the NDP won with 149 seats, in addition to 167 seats won members of
the ruling party who had competed as independent candidates. Further, 88 seats went to the Muslim
Brotherhood, which became for the first time the largest opposition in the PA. 288. Despite, the regime's
continuing interference in the electoral process "through vote buying, fraud and intimidation,"289 the
Muslim Brotherhood candidates "were allowed to campaign much more openly than in the past albeit
as independents.” 290
The regime responded to the Muslim Brotherhood electoral success with de-liberalizing measures
such as the systematic crack down on political opponents and popular protests. 291 Moreover, Mubarak
extended the state of emergency for another two years. 292 In 2007, the government issued 34
constitutional amendments putting further limitations on political rights and competition.293 For
example, the amendment to Article 5 on party pluralism excluded the "conduct of 'any political activity'
or the establishment of 'any political parties' within 'any religious frame of reference or on any religious
basis or on the basis of gender or origin'."294 Accordingly, the regime could "charge any religious
institution or civil organization with involvement in religiously inspired political activities."295 Further, the
amendment to Article 179, gave the regime the right to suspend the constitutional Articles 41, 44 and
45 in cases concerning the combat of terrorism.296 These Articles "were dedicated respectively to the
prohibition of arbitrary arrest, requirement of a judicial warrant for home visits and the protection of the
privacy of communications."297 Additionally, this amendment empowered the president to refer cases
related to the “security” of the state including crimes of “terrorism” to exceptional courts including
Military Courts. 298 Operating within the framework of the state of emergency and the Emergency Law,
these exceptional courts undermined the ordinary court system to the extent that the separation
between judicial system and the executive branch of the government was bypassed. 299
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Following these constitutional amendments, the PA elections in 2010 were marked by widespread
violations including mass arbitrary arrests of hundreds of opposition candidates before the vote and
restrictions on public campaigning.300 The election resulted in the overwhelming victory of the NDP,
which won 420 seats, whereas the opposition parties won only 15 seats including six seats for the
Wafd Party, five seats for the Unionist Party as well as one seat for each of the smaller parties such as
the Tomorrow Party, the Social Justice, the Generation as well as the Peace Party. 301 The Muslim
Brotherhood was only able to win one seat, as most of the seats won by the independent candidates
went to the NDP.302
In spite of the introduction of measures to democratization, including some limited advances in
political rights such as the freedom of press, “democracy” under Mubarak remained restricted to the
level of formal electoral participation. Therefore, democratization was confined to the extent that it did
not threaten to undermine the monopoly of the regime. For instance, while the number of political
parties increased from five to 24,303 political competition continued to be limited through the repression
of the opposition and electoral manipulation. In particular the Emergency Law served the regime to
bypass the Constitution and to constrain political rights and freedoms.
The state of emergency was first enforced by Nasser at the beginning of the 1967 War. Since then,
Egypt has been almost continuously governed under the Emergency Law. 304 After Sadat's
assassination in 1981, President Mubarak reinstated the state of emergency state, which was again
renewed in 2010. 305 The Emergency Law provides the government with far-reaching power, for
instance, to arrest anyone who “threatens national security” 306 or is suspected of “representing danger
to [...] the public order.”307 Furthermore, the law provides the President with the authority “to monitor
and seize all publications, advertisements, announcements, or other means of disseminating
information.”308
As party to the ICCPR, Egypt has the obligation under Article 25, 18, 19 and 21 to guarantee
political participation, the freedom of expression as well as to protect the right to peaceful assembly
and the freedom of association.309 However, in a time of public emergency limited derogations to these
articles, except for Article 18 on freedom of expression, are allowed. 310 The UN Human Rights
Committee stated with reference to Article 4 on public emergency that“[m]easures derogating from the
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provisions of the Covenant must be of an exceptional and temporary nature" and be "limited to the
extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.” 311 However, these requirements are not met
in Egypt, given that the state of emergency has been rather the norm than the exceptionality. 312 In this
respect, the limitations imposed by the state of emergency on political rights and freedoms reduced
democratic reforms to cosmetic measures. This “democratic exceptionalism” that limited democracy to
the level of formal participation, was imposed by the regime as strategy of “democratization,” holding
the view that economic reforms must proceed political changes. 313

B. Economic Dimension of Self-Determination
1. Integration into the Global Economy
The integration into the global economy began under Sadat's "open-door policy" in 1974. Introducing a
program of economic liberalization, this policy aimed at "shifting Egypt away from Nasser's centralized
economy and state-led development, towards a model of capitalist economy."314 Given that the
Egyptian economy was in extreme disrepair, 315 Sadat turned almost immediately to foreign sources of
capital to overcome the domestic shortfall.316 However, the fear of being expropriated held foreign
investors off entering the Egyptian market,317 despite the government's issuance of Law 43/1974 that
guaranteed protection against sequestration and nationalization. 318 Therefore, in 1976, Sadat
concluded a stabilization agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 319 This agreement
included measures such as the liberalization of imports, as well as the "reduction of the deficit by
controlling wages and cutting subsidies in the areas of basic staples, energy and government
services.”320
The implementation of cutting subsidies, in particular, with respect to food, resulted in the outbreak
of riots in 1977. As a consequence of the social unrest, the regime adopted "a limited version of
economic liberalization under which it would be committed to opening up the economy for foreign
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investment, but without compromising its corporatist role and welfare obligations."321 Throughout the
1970s and 1980s, the government continued to follow a etatist model of development with the
objective of avoiding political instability through mass protests. Accordingly, the state remained the
main actor in the economy with respect to areas such as basic social services and subsidies, resource
allocation and employment.322
In contrast in the 1990s, the government under Mubarak gave up on the etatist model of
development to foster the integration into the global economy through increased economic
liberalization. In this context, the regime committed to the implementation of the Economic Reform and
Structural Adjustment Program (ERSAP) under the supervision of the IMF and World Bank (WB). On
the one hand, the ERSAP was concerned with "short-term 'stabilization' which lay in the domain of the
IMF, and included fiscal and monetary reforms to reduce public consumption, increase public savings,
and achieve sustainable economic growth."323 On the other hand, ERSAP initiated "long-term
'structural adjustment' which was the responsibility of the WB and included measures such as publicenterprise reform, domestic price liberalization, foreign trade liberalization, and private sector
reform."324
The implementation of the ERSAP resulted in strong economic growth, notably, between 2003 and
2007. 325 However, the promotion of market-oriented reforms primarily benefited the interests of the
regime and its supporters, allowing them to reinforce their power, while excluding the rest of the
population from sharing in the economic development. 326 Particularly, the deterioration of the socioeconomic conditions through the rise of unemployment and poverty that accompanied the retreat of
the state from welfare services, contributed to the exclusion of large parts of the population.
In the context of the ERSAP, the state increasingly withdrew from its role as "primary economic
actor to a more subservient role in which it became mainly committed to support the private sector and
provide a conducive business environment for foreign investment."327 In order to reduce the state
involvement in the economy including the public expenditure, subsidies for social services were
increasingly declined.328 For example, in 2006 the fuel subsidy was reduced, which resulted in a 30
percent increase in the price of fuel.329 Other subsidy cuts affected, for instance, the prices of
electricity and transportation.330
The withdrawal of the state from the economy also increased the level of unemployment. For
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instance, the state abandoned its commitment to job creation in state-owned enterprises or through
public investment. This measure "was not matched with a significant growth in private investment,
whether domestic or foreign." 331 Moreover, with respect to the restructuring and privatization of the
public sector, the regime implemented among other measures "a policy of forced 'early retirement' of
public sector employees in order to reduce labour cost in the production process" in state-owned
enterprises. 332 As a result of this policy approximately 450,000 public sectors employees had to leave
their jobs between 1993 and 2002. 333
Other measures that were implemented included the liberalization of price controls that raised the
prices of basic goods such as sugar, bread and tea. 334 The cost of living was further increased through
the devaluations of the Egyptian pound by almost 100 percent in the context of the reform of the
exchange rate. The devaluations advanced in particular the prices of energy and imported
commodities, including basic food items such as wheat and flour increased. For instance, the price of
bread was raised by 36,4 percent, food oils by 60 percent, sugar by 20,8 percent in 2008.335 However,
the increase of the cost of living was not accompanied with higher salaries as the reduction of public
expenditure to attract private investment was also directed towards the decrease of the cost of
labour.336
These and other initiatives that were taken under the ERSAP contributed to the deterioration of
socio-economic conditions. In this regard, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
observed that “structural adjustment programmes and economic liberalization policies [...] impeded the
implementation of the [ICESCR]'s provisions, particularly with regard to the most vulnerable groups of
Egyptian society.”337 This tendency is evident in the rise of poverty. According to the WB, absolute
poverty338 increased from 16,7 percent in 2000 to 19,6 percent in 2005339 and 23,4 percent in 2008.340
Given that “participation and influence over decision-making are usually dependent on the degree of
access to material resources available," the deterioration of socio-economic conditions also
constrained the opportunities of political participation. 341 Therefore, the retreat of the welfare state not
only contributed to the widening of the gap between the rich and the poor, but likewise alienated large
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parts of the population from politics. 342 In contrast to the lack of access to resources of the majority of
the Egyptian population, other groups, particularly, business groups gained access to resources and
political influence.343
Through the implementation of selective economic reforms, the regime protected the interests of
influential groups and regime supporters including the military.344 In this respect, economic
liberalization served the regime “to re-distribute privileges to regime supporters and co-opt important
segments of the private sectors” in order to reinforce its social basis and guarantee its electoral
support. 345
2. Economic Liberalization and Democratization
Economic liberalization aimed at integrating Egypt into the global economy contributed to “an
environment of added constraints over political participation and pluralism.”

346

In particular, the socio-

economic impact of the structural adjustment program triggered popular resistance, to which the
regime responded with repression. 347 In this regard, rather than advancing a process of
democratization, the implementation of economic liberalization required the existence of an
authoritarian state. While the regime “reduced its developmental role, [it] maintained the monopoly
over political power [...] to enforce its political and economic agenda through the use of coercion and
repression of political and civil rights.” 348
Economic liberalization and democratization are often assumed to be “two mutually-reinforcing
processes, arguing that economic growth and liberalization largely depend on open competition and
predictability that could only be found in democratic societies.” 349 Therefore, democracy is considered
as the political equivalent of the free market. In this respect, the competition between individuals in the
political sphere is viewed as bearing resemblance to the interaction of the forces in the economic
sphere of the free market.350 On the contrary to authoritarian centralization, which extinguishes
“entrepreneurial initiatives and stifle informal sector activities, democratic rights are seen to safeguard
property and contractual rights, which in turn create the security and incentives necessary for
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economic growth."351
As the case of Egypt has illustrated, economic liberalization hindered rather than facilitated
democratization. As economic liberalization benefited mainly influential groups with connections to the
regime, 352 these groups had no interest in contesting the existing power structure. 353 In this context,
democratization was perceived as threat to the political status quo as well as the established socioeconomic privileges enjoyed by the regime and its supporters, given that democratization raises
opportunities for those disadvantaged by economic liberalization to organize and eventually block the
implementation of policies that are not directed towards the benefit of the people.354 However, this
means that economic liberalization in Egypt has neither empowered nor benefited the people on a
general basis, for instance, by making the people the centre of the political decision-making. In this
sense, the requirements for the liberalization of the Egyptian economy appeared to be incompatible
with “those requirements necessary for the institutionalization of democratic principles and
procedures,” such as the guarantee of rights and freedoms that allow for the expression of the popular
will. 355 In view of the deterioration of socio-economic conditions among the majority of the Egyptian
population as a result of economic liberalization,356 the regime responded with authoritarian measures
to contain social unrest and political opposition, given that the financial assistance provided by the WB
and IMF was considered indispensable to the survival of the Egyptian economy.357 Accordingly,
democracy was perceived as irreconcilable with the adjustment to the global economy, in particular,
because democratization might open up political space for popular mobilization, “which could in turn
undermine the political base of the regime.”358 In this respect, the erosion of political rights occurred
simultaneously with the implementation of economic liberalization. 359 Therefore, instead of advancing
a process of democratization, the implementation of economic liberalization contributed to the
stabilization rather than the deconstruction of authoritarianism in Egypt.360
In spite of the diversity of the countries in the MENA and beyond, 361 in which “democracy has
stagnated or been rolled back, most have ended up in a similar state - not with full-fledged
dictatorships, but with a particular style of semi-authoritarian regime” or low-intensity democracy.362
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Those critical of the neo-liberal globalization argue that “to free global markets from state control
through deregulation,” for instance, by means of the privatisation of public enterprises and the
institutionalisation of flexible labour markets, has created a “minimalist state.”363 Even though, this
concept entails an elected government, it constrains peoples' right to political participation, which is
central to substantive democracy and popular sovereignty.364
The emergence of global markets “operating as extra-juridical, extra-jurisdictional or supra-national
phenomena” challenges the very notion of democracy.365 In this regard, the inability of national
governments to impose rules and regulations to control the forces of the global market has
undermined democratic accountability and political legitimacy.366 Moreover, the lack of democratic
participation of peoples in the global economy,367 “precludes the exercise of real national sovereignty
and the implementation of truly democratic decisions” on the national level.368 In this context,
particularly, the imposition of structural adjustment programs on governments by international
institutions such as the IMF and WB, directly impacts upon peoples' right to determine the nature of
their economic and political system. In addition to regulating the labour market, structural adjustment
programs also shape the extent to which people can access, for instance, education and pensions. In
this respect, they set the policy choices available to governments in pivotal areas of political and
constitutional authority.369 Consequently, the failure of international institutions to introduce
“mechanisms by which they can be held accountable to local people,” 370 compromises the right of
peoples to political and economic self-determination. 371
In order to enhance the interaction between national governments and the global market, the PostWashington-Consensus 372, for instance, stresses the importance of democratic institutions to improve
economic performance of nation states. 373 However, this not only reduces the concept of democracy
to the political sphere of the nation state, but also takes existing power structures at the global level,
for example between powerful and less powerful states, as predetermined.374 In this respect, without
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making global institutions of capital accountable, representative institutions at the national level, “no
matter how 'democratic' in form,” will simply be a reflection of the undemocratic power relations of
society. 375

375 Gills & Rocamora, supra note 20, at 520.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The popular demonstrations in Egypt, which led to the resignation of President Mubarak on February
11, 2011 have not ended, albeit the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which has
assumed the control of the government, declared its intention to introduce a process to democratic
transition. 376 The principal goal of the protests continues to constitute the demand for the radical
change of the system defined by corruption, oppression and a tightly restricted space for political
organization and participation.377 In this regard, the protesters' demands for “bread, freedom, and
social justice”378 entail the ”non-ideological” desire to recapture the political sphere to political and
economic self-determination.
Since the establishment of the Egyptian Republic under President Nasser, political selfdetermination has been state-centred, given that the authoritarian state structures rather allowed for
the imposition of reforms from above than the expression of the popular will. Although under President
Sadat the existence of multi-partyism and elections provided for some measures of participation, these
were rather formal than substantive in nature as they neither allowed the people to participate in the
decision-making process, nor to determine the nature of the political system. Likewise, under
President Mubarak “democracy” remained restricted to the level of formal electoral participation,
despite the introduction of some democratic measures including limited advances in political rights.
Politically, self-determination was thus confined to the extent that it did not threaten to undermine the
monopoly of the regime.
With respect to the economic sphere, the implementation of market-oriented reforms, which began
under Sadat, aimed at the transformation of Nasser's state-led economy into a capitalist model of
economy. The economic liberalization and structural adjustment resulted in strong macro economic
growth, though this primarily benefited the regime and its supporters, notably the business groups and
the military. In this context, the deterioration of the socio-economic conditions contributed to the
exclusion of large parts of the population. The increase in poverty also limited the opportunities of the
majority of the Egyptians to political participation. In this regard, democratization was perceived as
threat to the political status quo and the established socio-economic privileges enjoyed by the regime
and its supporters. Accordingly, economic liberalization in Egypt has neither empowered nor benefited
the majority of the Egyptians to the extent that it allowed for people's self-determination.
As the decades of market-oriented reforms have illustrated, economic liberalization in Egypt
benefited mainly influential groups with connections to the regime, whereas the vast majority of the
population suffered under deteriorating living conditions. Therefore, instead of advancing a process of
democratization, the implementation of economic liberalization contributed to the consolidation rather
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than the deconstruction of authoritarianism. In this regard, the imposition of structural adjustment
packages by international institutions has directly impacted upon peoples' right to political and
economic self-determination. Hence, the establishment of substantive democracy at the national level
is unlikely without making international institutions including the “private” domain of the global markets
accountable. In this context, the demonstrations that erupted in Egypt on January 25, 2011, can not be
reduced to the question of “democratic transition” as long as the lack of democracy at the global level
precludes exercise of real sovereignty and the implementation of truly democratic decisions at the
national level.
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